The fast evolving nature of modern cyber threats and network monitoring needs calls for new, "software-defined", approaches to simplify and quicken programming and deployment of online (stream-based) traffic analysis functions. StreaMon is a carefully designed data-plane abstraction devised to scalably decouple the "programming logic" of a traffic analysis application (tracked states, features, anomaly conditions, etc.) from elementary primitives (counting and metering, matching, events generation, etc), efficiently pre-implemented in the probes, and used as common instruction set for supporting the desired logic. Multi-stage multi-step real-time tracking and detection algorithms are supported via the ability to deploy custom states, relevant state transitions, and associated monitoring actions and triggering conditions. Such a separation entails platform-independent, portable, online traffic analysis tasks written in a high level language, without requiring developers to access the monitoring device internals and program their custom monitoring logic via low level compiled languages (e.g., C, assembly, VHDL). We validate our design by developing a prototype and a set of simple (but functionally demanding) use-case applications and by testing them over real traffic traces. Index Terms-SDN, network monitoring, XFSM Ç M. Bonola and S. Pontarelli are with the Research unit Tor Vergata,
INTRODUCTION
T HE sheer volume of networked information, in conjunction with the complexity and polymorphous nature of modern cyberthreats, calls for scalable, accurate, and, at the same time, flexible and programmable monitoring systems [1] , [2] . The challenge is to promptly react to fastly mutating needs by deploying custom traffic analyses, capable of tracking event chains and multi-stage attacks, and efficiently handle the many heterogeneous features, events, and conditions which characterize an operational failure, a network application mis-behavior, an anomaly or an incoming attack. Such needed level of flexibility and programmability should not impact the overall system performances. This is achieved through systematic exploitation of stream-based analysis techniques. Moreover, traffic analyses and mitigation primitives should be ideally brought inside the monitoring probes themselves at data plane, so as to avoid exporting traffic data to central analysis points, an hardly adequate way to cope with the traffic scale and the strict (ideally real time) mitigation delay requirements.
To face this rapidly evolving scenario, in this paper we propose StreaMon, a data-plane programming abstraction for stream-based monitoring tasks directly running over network probes. StreaMon is devised as a pragmatic tradeoff between full programmability and vendors' need to keep their platforms closed. StreaMon's strategy closely resembles that pioneered by Openflow [3] in the abstraction of networking functionalities, thus paving the road towards software-defined networking. 1 However, the analogy with Openflow limits to the strategic level; in its technical design, StreaMon significantly departs from Openflow for the very simple reason that (as discussed in Section 2) the data-plane programmability of monitoring tasks exhibits very different requirements with respect to the data-plane programmability of networking functionalities, and thus mandate for different programming abstractions. The actual contribution of this paper is threefold.
(1) We identify (and design an execution platform for) an extremely simple abstraction which appears capable of supporting a wide range of monitoring application requirements. The proposed API decouples the monitoring application "logic", externally provided by a third party programmer via (easy to code) eXtended Finite State Machines (XFSM), from the actual "primitives", namely configurable sketchbased measurement modules, d-left hash tables, state management primitives, and export/mitigation actions, hard-coded in the device. While our handling of sketch-based measurement primitives may 1 . And in fact, even if the focus of this paper is (as a first step) only on the data plane interface itself, we believe that StreaMon could eventually candidate to play the role of a possible southbound data-plane interface for Software-Defined Monitoring frameworks, devised to translate high level monitoring tasks into a sequence of low-level traffic analysis programs distributed into network-wide StreaMon probes.
recall [4] , we radically differentiate from any other work we are aware of, in our proposal to inject monitoring logic in the form of XFSM devised to locally orchestrate and run-time adapt measurements to the tracked state for each monitored entity (flows, hosts, DNS names, etc), with no need to resort to an external controlling device. (2) We implement two StreaMon platform prototypes, a full SW and a FPGA/SW integrated implementation. We functionally validate them with five use case examples (P2P traffic classification, Conficker botnet detection, packet entropy HW analysis, DDos detection, Port Knocking), not meant as stand-alone contributions, but rather selected to showcase the StreaMon's adaptability to different application requirements. However, we remark that the aim of the paper is to propose a flexible framework for network monitoring. Therefore the described SW and hybrid implementations are only some examples of the possible engineering solutions. Even if, a pure hardware solution could maximally exploit the speed characteristics of the proposed framework, we preferred to deploy an hybrid solution to better show the speed characteristics of the framework and to prove that an efficient StreaMon implementation does not require the time of an ASIC development. (3) We assess the performance of the proposed approach: even if the current prototype implementation is not primarily designed with performance requirements in mind, we show that it can already sustain traffic in the multi-gbps range even with several instantiated metrics (for example 2.315 Gbps of real world replayed traffic with 16 metrics, see Section 6.2); moreover, we show that scalability can be easily enhanced by offloading the SW implementation with HW accelerated metrics; in essence, it seems fair to say that scalability appears to be an architectural property of our proposed API, rather than a side effect of an efficient implementation.
StreaMon Limitations
StreaMon trades speed (all StreaMon operations are performed at line rate and on the fast path) with complexity and extensiveness of the supported algorithms (although the unique feature of being able to track states at wire rate, and associate different metrics and features to different states, gives us a clearcut advantage over rule-based approaches which, by design, cannot dynamically adapt rules in the packet-level time-scale). Specifically, the most important limitations of StreaMon are the following:
(1) StreaMon might not be suitable for some applications requiring long time observation windows.
The choice of streaming packet processing is able to significantly reduce the memory footprint and to increase the throughput, while at the same time it reduce the applicability of this framework when packet storage is mandatory. However, we believe that a wide variety of monitoring applications can be implemented in "stream mode". (2) StreaMon, by design, does not provide the primitives required by complex mathematical/statistical analysis and DPI (e.g., FFT, data entropy calculation, data correlation, regex matching ). As we will show in the paper, some of these limitations can be resolved when an hybrid HW/SW approach is used. In the HW/SW approach the high complex tasks are offloaded to an FPGA. In other cases, StreaMon is still a powerful tool for packet preprocessing, in which the target of StreaMon is to reduce the amount of traffic to send to an external system for further analysis.
STREAMON ABSTRACTION
Our strategy in devising an abstraction for deploying stream-based monitoring tasks over a (general-purpose) network monitoring probe is similar in spirit to that brought about by the designers of the Openflow [3] match/action abstraction, for programming networking functionalities over a switching fabric. Indeed, we also aim at identifying a compromise between full programming flexibility, so as to adapt to the very diverse needs of monitoring application developers and permit a broad range of innovation, and consistency with the vendors' need for closed platforms. However, the requirements of monitoring applications appear largely different from that of a networking functionality, and this naturally drives towards a different pragmatic abstraction with respect to a match/action table. At least three important differences do emerge. First, the "entity" being monitored is not consistently associated with the same packet field(s). For instance, if the target is to detect whether an IP address (monitored entity) is a bot, and the chosen mechanism is to analyze if the percentage of DNS NXDomain replies (feature) is greater than a given threshold (condition), the flow key to use for accounting is the source IP address when the arriving packet is a DNS query (event), but becomes the destination IP address when the packet is a DNS response (a different event).
Second, the type of analysis (and possibly the monitoring entity target) entailed by a monitoring application may change over time, dynamically adapting to the knowledge gathered so far. For instance, if an IP address exhibits a critical percentage of DNS NXDomain replies, hence a bot suspect, we may further track its TCP SYNACK/SYN ratio and determine whether horizontal network scans occur, so as to reinforce our suspicion. And we might then follow up by deriving even more in-depth features, e.g., based on deep packet inspection. But at the same time, we would like to avoid tracking all features for all the possible flows, as this would unnecessarily drain computational resources.
Finally, activities associated to a monitoring task are not all associated to a matching functionality: only measurement and accounting tasks are. Rather, less frequent, but crucial, activities (such as exporting alerts, changing states, setting a filtering rule, and so on) are based on decisions taken on what we learned so far, and which are hence triggered by conditions applied to the gathered features.
Our proposed StreaMon abstraction, illustrated in Fig. 1 , appears capable to cope with such requirements (as more extensively shown with the use cases presented in Section 4). It comprises of three "stages", programmable by the monitoring application developer via external means (i.e., not accessing the internal probe platform implementation).
(1) The Identification stage permits the programmer to specify what is the monitored entity (more precisely, deriving its primary key, i.e., a combination of packet fields that identify the entity) associated to an event triggered by the actual packet under arrival, as well as retrieve an eventually associated state. 2 (2) The Measurement stage permits the programmer to configure which information should be accounted. It integrates hard-coded and efficiently implemented hashbased measurement primitives (metric modules), fed by configurable packet fields, with externally programmed features, expressed as arbitrary arithmetic operations on the metric modules' output. (3) The Decision stage is the most novel aspect of our abstraction. It permits to take decisions programmed in the form of XFSM, i.e., check conditions associated to the current state and tested over the currently computed features, and trigger actions and/or state transitions. The obvious compromise in our proposed approach is that (as per the match/action Openflow primitives) new metrics or actions can only be added by directly implementing them over the monitoring devices, thus extending the device capabilities. However, even restricting to our actual StreaMon prototype, the subset of metrics we implemented appear reusable and sufficient to support features proposed in a set of literature applications-see Table 1 in Section 3.2.
STREAMON PROCESSING ENGINE

System Components
The previously introduced abstraction can be concretely implemented by a stream processing engine whose architecture is depicted in Fig. 2 . It consists of four modular layers descriptively organized into two subsystems, namely Measurement subsystem and Logic subsystem, detailed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. [13] SVM-based method for P2P traffic classification Per distinct host and port: (i) ratio between TCP and UDP traffic; (ii) AVG traffic speed; (iii) ratio between TCP and UDP AVG packet length; Per distinct IP: (i) ARP request count, (ii) ratio between sent/received TCP, UDP packet, (iii) ratio between {TCP, UDP} and total traffic; Per distinct port: traffic duration [14] Mail spammer detection via Network level analysis (i) AVG/STD msg len in past 24h; (ii) AVG distance to 20 nearest IP neighbors of the sender; (iii) AVG/STD of geodesic distance between sender and recipient; (iv) Message body len; (v) AVG, STD and total no. different recipients 2. Our implementation uses d-left hashes for O(1) complexity in managing states. Also, memory consumption can be greatly reduced by opportunistically storing only non-default (e.g., anomalous) states. See the illustrative experiment in Section 5 Fig. 12 , for a rough idea of the attainable saving in the Conficker detection example.
Event layer-Such layer is in charge of parsing each raw captured packet, and match an event among those userprogrammed via the StreaMon API. The matched event specifies a user-programmed primary key which permits to retrieve an eventually stored state (as discussed below, states are not stored by default, but handled only when explicitly mandated by the programmer). In essence, the primary key acts as generalized flow identifier; it can be an IP source address, or a 5-tuple flow, or a DNS name, or any other information which can be extracted from the packet header fields. The event layer is further in charge of supplementary technical tasks (see Section 3.3), such as handling timeout events, deriving secondary keys, etc.
Metric layer-StreaMon operates on a per-packet basis and does not store any (raw) traffic in a local database. The application programmer can instantiate a number of pre-developed metrics, implemented as computation/memory efficient multi-hash data structures (i.e., Bloom-type sketches), updated at every packet arrival. Such data structures permit to track, via their compact, implicit state, metrics frequently recurring in most monitoring applications (counts, unique counts, smoothed rate measurements, set matching, etc). The programmer chooses the number and type of metrics used, the packet related information used to feed such metrics (e.g., count unique DNS requests, add packet size in bytes, etc.), and the configuration of the data structures used for the metric computation (e.g., memory, number of hash, smoothing parameter, etc).
Feature layer-this layer permits to compute userprogrammed arithmetic functions over (one or more) metric values. For instance, the percentage of a certain type of DNS responses returning from a given DNS server is computed as the ratio between the total number/rate of responses, accounted by one metric block, and the number/rate of such specific responses accounted by a second, separate metric module. In essence, whereas metrics carry out the task of collecting basic statistics in a scalable and computation/ memory efficient manner, the features have the goal of providing derived statistics tailored to the specific application needs, at no extra computational/memory cost.
Decision layer-this final processing stage implements the actual application logic conveyed to StreaMon through an XFSM. This layer keeps a list of conditions expressed as mathematical/logical functions of the feature vector provided by the previous layer and any other possible secondary status. Each condition will trigger a set of specified and pre-implemented actions and a state transition.
StreaMon's Programming Language
Application programmers describe their desired monitoring operations through an high-level XML-like language, which permits to specify custom (dynamic) states, configure measurement metrics, formalize when (e.g., in which state and for which event) and how (i.e., by performing which operations over available metrics and state information) to extract features, and under which conditions trigger relevant actions (e.g., send an alert or data to a central controller). We remark that a monitoring application formally specified using our XML description does not require to be compiled by application developers, but is run-time installed, thus significantly simplifying on-field deployment. StreaMon versatility and programmability will be assessed in Section 4, where we will show, via four simple but functionally different uses cases, how different monitoring applications, which would require ad-hoc software implementation, can instead be implemented on top of StreaMon with few lines of textual configuration and meta programming language.
HW Acceleration
StreaMon allows the seamless integration of HW accelerated metrics, e.g., mandated by stringent performance requirements. This remains transparent to the application programmer, which can thus port the same application from a SW based probe to a dedicated HW platform with no changes in the application program. Seamless HW integration is technically accomplished by performing all metrics, parsing, and event matching HW-accelerated computations in a front-end (in our specific case, an FPGA), and by bringing the relevant results up to the user plane through a HW/SW interface. Since the output of the HW acceleration task is application dependent, we decided to provide the response of the hardware acceleration layer as a list of Type Len Value (TLV). This allows a flexible and lightweight method to send the computed data from the HW to the SW layer. We remark that we do not developed an abstraction to design metrics in HW, which is by the way an open and hot research topic, but we only defined a usable interface to bring data collected by the HW to the SW layer.
The motivations behind the use of a HW acceleration are mainly two: 1) if the measurement task requires the matching of multiple wildcard rules (such as ACL), the matching of multiple rules that consider rule dependent header fields requires tables that are commonly implemented by means of TCAM. The TCAM functionalities cannot be realized in software at wire speed, and therefore require a hardware implementation. Possible examples of monitoring tasks that imply the use of TCAM are related to the measurement of the number of packets that match a specific rule, or a set of rules. 2) deep packet inspection algorithms like string matching, regular expressions, checksum calculation, packet data entropy or data compression/decompression require to inspect the whole packet and are very resource demanding. Therefore it is not possible to run it on the software layer.
Measurement Subsystem
The StreaMon Measurement subsystem provides a fast, computation/memory efficient, set of n highly configurable built-in modules that allows a programmer to deploy and compute a wide range of traffic features in stream mode.
Multi-Hash Metric module (MH)-From a high level point of view, StreaMon metric modules are functional blocks exporting a simple interface to update and retrieve metric values associated to a given key. Even though in principle such modules can be implemented with any compact data structure compatible to our proposed stream mode approach (and indeed the current architecture support pluggable user defined metric modules), several metrics of practical interest can be derived from a basic structure depicted in Fig. 3 and extending the construction proposed in [5] . It permits to count (or time-average, see below)
distinct values (called variations in [5] ) associated to a same key; for example: the number of distinct IP destinations contacted by a same IP source, or the number of distinct DNS names associated to a same IP address. The MH module is implemented using Bloom filter extensions [5] , [6] , [7] . Processing occurs in three stages: (i) extract from the packet 3 two binary strings, Detector FlowKey (DFK) and Monitor FlowKey (MFK), that will be used in to query the subsequent filters; (ii) detect whether the DFK has already appeared in a past time window (Variation Detector filter, VD), and if this is the case, iii) account to the MFK key some packet-related quantity (e.g., number of bytes, or simply add 1 if packet count is targeted) to the third stage's Variation Monitor (VM) filter. The reader interested in the rationale behind such construction and in further design details may refer to [5] . Finally note that, as a special case, the MH module can be configured to either i) provide an ordinary count, by disabling the VD stage, or ii) perform a match for checking whether some information associated to the incoming packet is first seen (in a given time window), by disabling the VM stage.
Programming the Measurement subsystem-StreaMon programmers can deploy two types of "counting" data structures: (i) an ordinary Count Sketch that sums a value associated to the MFK (CBF) or (ii) a Time decaying Bloom Filter (TBF) [7] that performs a smoothed (exponentially decaying) average of a value associated to the MFK. At deployment time, an MH module is configured by: (i) enabling/disabling the VD or the VM; (ii) specifying the counting data structure in the VM; (iii) setting the MH parameters, i.e., number of hash functions, total memory allocated, swapping threshold [5] or memory time window in the VD, TBF's smoothing parameter [7] ; (iv) chain multiple MH module (so as to update a metric only if a former one was updated). At run time, the programmer may dynamically change flowkeys and updating quantities. In particular, for each possible event and (if needed) flow status, a list of Metric Operations (MOP) is defined, where a MOP is a set/get primitive that defines the flowkeys (as a packet fields combinations) and quantities to be monitored/accounted. Finally, a set of StreaMon metrics are combined into Features by simply defining mathematical functions
What practical features can be supported?-We believe that the above metrics fulfill the needs of a non negligible fraction of real world monitoring applications. Indeed, [7] shows a concrete example of a real world application reimplemented by just using modules derived from our general MH module described above. Indeed, limiting to the StreaMon's measurement subsystem (we will significantly extend the framework in the next section), Table 1 shows features considered in a number of works taken from a somewhat heterogeneous set (different targets, operating at different network layers, different classification approaches) which, according to our analysis, are readily deployed through suitable configuration of the above metrics/ features. Indeed, most applications either require to track/ match (1) features that are directly retrievable from a single packet and do not have memory of past values (e.g.,: short life of a DNS domain, message body length, all the features in [10] except the first one); and/or (2) require counting or averaging over a various set of parameters (eventually uniquely accounted-e.g. variations), which are readily instantiated with an MH module 4 ; and/or (3) require logical/mathematical combinations of different statistics, which is the goal of our Feature Layer. Traffic features not covered by the families listed above are those which require a stateful correlation of different flows status. Such metrics (like the ones exploited in [11] ) are supported by StreaMon but require the stateful framework described in Section 3.3.
Logic Subsystem
StreaMon's Logic Subsystem is the result of the interwork between the Event Layer and the Decision Layer. It provides the application developer with the ability to customize the tracking logic associated to a monitored entity subject to specific user-defined conditions, so as to provide a verdict and/or perform analyses beyond those provided by the Monitoring Subsystem.
Event layer-The Event Layer generates the events triggering the StreaMon processing chain, identifies the monitored entity (primary key), and retrieves the specific event context (in particular the flow status). This layer is further composed of three functional component: (i) the capture engine responsible for "capturing" the triggering event, either a "packet arrival" or a "timeout expiration";(ii) the timeout manager in charge of keeping track of all registered timeouts and manage their expiration; (iii) the status table, a (DLEFT hash) table storing the status associated to the processed flows-the primary key status-and the so-called secondary support table, a table storing states not associated to the primary key but required by the application state machine to take some decision.
The triggering event is associated to a primary key, i.e., the monitored entity (flow, host, etc) under investigation for which the monitoring application will provide a final verdict, like "infected" or "legitimate". For intercepted packets, the primary key is a combination of packet fields parsed by the (extensible) protocol dissector implemented in this layer. For locally generated timeout expiration 3. Even if, for simplicity of explanation, we account such an extraction to the MH module, for obvious performance reasons we perform packet parsing and the consequent extraction of the flowkeys DFK and MFK once for all, for all metrics, in the Event Layer. Indeed, different metrics may make usage of a same packet field. 4 . For instance, the number of bytes exchanged between two hosts can be obtained by setting as VMK is the concatenation of source and destination IP address and as updating quantity the length field of the packet; similarly, unique counts such as the total number of distinct TTL for a given DNS domain is obtained by setting as VDK the concatenation of Domain Name and TTL in the DNS response and as VMK is the Domain Name. events, the primary key is retrieved from the timeout context. The primary key is used to retrieve the current status of the flow: no match in the state table is considered to be a default state.
If the primary key is not directly retrievable from the packet, and instead the flow status is related to some other flow previously processed, a secondary support table storing the references to the entries in the status table is used. Such secondary support table is called related status table.
For example, this can be the case of an application keeping track of SIP URIs, (i.e.,: the primary key is the SIP user ID in SIP INVITE messages) and consider as suspicious all UDP packets related to a data connection with a suspicious SIP user. In case of UDP packets, neither of the packet fields can be used to retrieve the flow status. Instead, a secondary support table is used to keep a reference between the socket 5-tuple and the status entry of the associated SIP initiator user. If the application does not take into account the flow status, the flow is skipped.
Exploiting secondary support tables. The flow status is fundamental to keep track of the traffic evolution, but it may not be enough in case of combined protocol analysis. Suppose we are tracking the IP address in the intercepted packets and considering two type of events: (i) DNS packet interception; (ii) TCP packets interception. For example, in case of DNS requests, the application will require some prestored status of the Domain Name carried in the packet payload. This status in not referred to the primary key under investigation (i.e.: the source IP addresses) but it will be used anyway in combination with some features also in case of received TCP packets. Such kind of support status are stored in the secondary support tables, a variable number of tables defined by the users and dynamically updated by the application XFSM. Programming the logic subsystem-Programmers describe an XFSM specifying (i) states and triggering events; (ii) for each state, which metrics and features are updated and which auxiliary information is collected/processed (secondary table); (iii) which conditions trigger a state transition and the associated actions.
To identify the triggering event, StreaMon keeps a list of user-defined "event descriptors", expressed as a 3-tuple (type, descriptor, primary key). For example, in case of intercepted packets, an event can be defined as: ðpacket; ðudp:dport ¼¼ 53Þ; ip:srcÞ.
Moreover, programmers are given primitives to define for each event and state: (i) a set of metric operations as described in Section 3.2; (ii) a set of conditions expressed as an arithmetic function of features and secondary support table values. For each condition, programmers define a set of built-in actions and a state transition.
A Simple StreaMon Application
The following code snippet represents the actual XML binding of a StreaMon application executing a simple TCP port scan detection and mitigation XFSM (depicted in Fig. 5 ).
1
<source type="live" name="eth0"/> 2 <statedef id="default" /> 3 <statedef id="attack" /> 4 5 <metrics> 6
<metric name="m1"> <variation_detector status="on"/> 8 <variation_monitor status="on" 9 type="tbf" window="1 "life="0.002"/> 10 </metric> 11 </metrics> 12 13 <features> 14
<feature name="conn_rate" body="m1"/> 15 </features> 16 17 <event type="packet" selector="proto tcp 18 and flags tcp-syn" primary-key="ip_src"> 19 20
<state id="default"> 21
<use-metric id="m1" vm_update="ip_src" 22
vd_update="ip_src-ip_dst-dst_port"/> 23 24 <condition expr="conn_rate > 20" 25
action="LOG(attack from %ip_src), 26
DROP(%ip_src, %ip_dst)" 27 next_state="attack"> 28 29
<condition expr="true" action= ""next_state=""/> 30 31 <timeout_set key="ip_src" class="TO1" 32 value="10" primary-key=""/> 33 </condition> 34 </state> 35 36 <state id="attack"> 37
<use-metric id="m1" 38
vd_update="ip_src|ip_dst|tcp_dport" 39
vm_update="ip_src" /> 40 41
<condition expr="true" 42 action="LOG(port scanner %ip_src 43 trying to contact %ip_dst)" next_state=""/> 44 </state> 45 </event> 46 47 <event type="timeout" class="TO1"> 48 <state id="attack"> 49 <condition expr="true" 50 action="LOG(allow host %ip_src), 51 ALLOW(%ip_src, %ip_dst)" 52 next_state="default" > 53 54
<timeout_set key="ip_src" class="TO1" 55 value="0" primary-key="" /> 56 </condition> 57
This applications starts with few simple initializations. Line 1 configures a real time live capture on network interface eth0 and line 2-3 define two application states, a normal (default) state and an attack state. All packets received from a source address in attack state are dropped.
In lines 5-11 a single Time decaying Bloom Filter [7] metric element m1 is allocated and configured. Note that here is not defined how a packet will updated this metric. Such decision will be taken at run time for each possible packet event (see lines 21-22 and 37-39) .
Lines 13-15 simply define a feature f1, which in this applications is exactly the value of m1.
From line 17 the application XFSM is described. A StreaMon XFSM consists of a list of event sections enclosed in the <event> tag. Each event element is structured as the following tree: <event #id type=".." selector=".." primary_key=".."> <state #id> <use-metric #id /> <condition #id expr=".." action=".." next_state=".." /> </state> </event> For each event (whose type, selector and primary_key extractor are specified) a set of current states is listed. For each state a set of metrics is updated and a set of conditions is linearly queried. A matched condition will trigger a set of actions and a state transition. This application considers two events: the arrival of a TCP SYN packet (lines 17-45) and a timeout expiration (lines 47-58).
If a TCP SYN packet is received, the flow is identified by the primary key ip_src. If the flow is in default state (lines 21-37), the TBF metric m1 is updated with a variation detector (VD) key consisting of the concatenation of the following fields: ip_src, ip_dst and (TCP) dst_port. If the VD returns 0 (i.e.: the triplet source ip address, destination ip address and destination port is at its first occurrence) the variation monitor is updated with key ip_src (lines [22] [23] [24] . In other words, the metric element m1 measures for each VM key a time decaying exponential average of the number of distinct VD keys. Once m1 is updated, a simple condition is verified. If f 1 > 15 a DROP rule is inserted, a timeout is scheduled in 10 seconds and the next state is set to attack.
If the flow is in attack state (lines 36-44), m1 is updated as in default state and a simple LOG message is stored. In case of timeout expiration (lines 57), which can only occurs in attack state, the flow previously set to be dropped is released and a simple LOG message is registered.
SIMPLE USE CASE EXAMPLES
We use the following simple examples to highlight the flexibility of StreaMon in supporting heterogeneous features commonly found in real-world monitoring applications. The input data traces are obtained by properly merging a packet trace gathered from a regional Internet provider with either (i) real malicious traffic extracted from traces captured in our campus network (use case 4.1) or (ii) synthetic traces properly generated in our laboratories (use case 4.2).
P2P Traffic Classification
This example shows how straightforward is the implementation of the traffic features described in [15] for detecting peer to peer protocols that use UDP and TCP connections. This (stateless) application considers the following packet events (which ignore well known UDP/TCP ports): E 1 : ifðip:proto ¼¼ UDP Þ&&ðudp:port 6 ¼ 25; 53; 110; :::Þ E 2 : ifðip:proto ¼¼ TCP Þ&&ðtcp:port 6 ¼ 25; 53; 110; :::Þ and extracts the following traffic features F 1 ¼ M 1 &M 2 and F 2 ¼ jM 3 À M 4 j where: fM 1 ; M 2 g: VD enabled-return 1 for each IP src/dst pair which previously opened a {UDP, TCP} socket, 0 otherwise; fM 3 ; M 4 g: VD enabled and VM type CBF-count the number of different {TCP source ports, hosts} connected to the same destination IP address.
Metrics are read/updated on the basis of the matched event, as follows: A p2p client is detected if the following condition holds after a transitory period: ðF 1 ¼¼ 1&&ðF 2 < 10ÞÞ.
Testing this configuration we found that StreaMon can detect hosts that were performing p2p with probability of 94 percent and a false positive ratio of about 11 percent over a trace captured within the campus unprotected WiFi network.
DDOS Detection and Mitigation
In this section we sketch a simple algorithm which can be used as an initial base for detecting and mitigating DDOS attacks. The algorithm is driven by the number of SYN packets received by possible DDOS targets. The XFSM of this configuration is depicted in 4.b, and is governed by the following two events: (1) a TCP SYN is received; (2) a timeout is expired. Metric M 1 (VD=off, VM=TBF) tracks the number of TCP SYN addressed to a same target in 60 seconds (with 240 s TBF's memory). All external servers for which F 1 ¼ M 1 is under a given threshold (100 in this example) are in default state (because they are obviously not under attack and thus do not need an explicit status). When F 1 exceeds this threshold, the target goes in monitored state, a timeout is set and the current value of F 1 value is stored into a secondary support table with key ip.dst. As soon as this timeout expires, the difference between the current feature value and the one stored is computed. If the condition ifðF 1 ðtÞ > 1:2 Ã F 1 ðt À 1ÞÞ, holds for two consecutive times, i.e. the rate of TCP SYN has increased twice for more than 20 percent, the flow goes into an attack state.
When in such state, an ideal algorithm should protect the target by dropping only malicious TCP SYN packets, and by still forwarding legitimate traffic, our use case example mimics this mitigation strategy by considering legitimate all the source hosts that have already shown meaningful activity and contacted the server before the actual emergence of the attack, and thus likely dropping most of the TCP SYN having a spoofed source IP address. In our use case example, a second metric M 2 tracks the TCP SYN rate, smoothed over a chosen time window, at which which each host contacts each destination IP addresses (M 2 is configured with VD disabled and VM of type TBF with smoothing window 240 s, and it is updated with MFK ðIP src ; IP dst Þ. Fig. 6 shows the temporal evolution of the state of a server, in an experiment where we performed a DDoS attack, with spoofed TCP SYN packets, after about 140 s. The figure also reports the measured TCP SYN rate, as well as the traffic generated by two hosts performing regular queries towards the server: one starting at time 0, and the other starting right in the middle of the attack. When the actual attack is detected, the mitigation strategy starts filtering traffic. Thanks to the second tracked metric, M 2 , the user starting activities before the DDoS attack is not filtered; on the contrary, connections from sources not previously detected via the M 2 metric are blocked, as shown by the green curve. New connections can be accepted as soon the server leaves the attack state (see F 2 for the second host).
HW Accelerated Detection of Non Standard Encrypted Traffic
This example shows how HW metrics can be integrated in StreaMon. Since one of the task performed during deep packet inspection is the collection of statistics on byte frequencies, offsets for common byte-values, packet entropy, we illustrate an use case that is a simplified version of the approach described in [16] , in which encrypted flows are detected by combining two traffic features: (i) the bit entropy of a packet; (ii) the percentage of printable characters, i.e., ASCII characters in the range ½32 . . . 127. Both features are computationally demanding for a software implementation, whereas they are best delegated to an FPGA implementation (just 250 logic cells for our implementation). This use case implements a simple stateless StreaMon application with the following characteristics: (i) it considers as event the reception of a UDP or TCP packet with length greater than 100 bytes; (ii) the primary key is the socket 5tuple of the packet; (iii) it makes use of two FPGA precomputed metrics: popcount (number of bit set to 1) M 1 and printable chars percentage M 2 (which is directly mapped into a StreaMon feature F 1 ¼ M 1 ); (v) the packet entropy Feature F 2 is obtained as À 1 N P 1 i¼0 n i Á ðlogðn i ÞÀ logðNÞ, where N ¼ len; n 0 ¼ N À M 1 ; n 1 ¼ M 1 . An encrypted flow is detected if: ðF 2 < 0:75Þ&ðÀ3s < F1À H U ðlÞ < 3sÞ where H U ðlÞ is the entropy of a packet with uniform distribution of 1 in the payload and length l and s is the standard deviation. Fig. 7 shows M 1 and M 2 to the simple case of HTTP (unencrypted) and SSL (encrypted) traffic, and as in [16] justify the condition expressed above.
Port Knocking
This use case shows how a stateful firewall application can be easily implemented with StreaMon. In particular, this use case implements a port knocking mechanism to enable SSH access. The application's XFSM is depicted in Fig. 8 . SSH access will be granted only to those clients guessing the correct port sequence 5,000, 4,000, 7,000 (a short sequence only for presentation convenience).
The application considers four events (TCP SYN received respectively on port 5,000, 4,000, 7,000, other ports) and four states (default, 5000contacted, 4000contacted, allowed). A state transition is triggered only if the client (identified by the IP source address) contacts the expected port in the sequence. If after a state transition the next port is not contacted in 5 seconds, the status is rolled back to default.
In addition, to avoid random port scanning for guessing the correct sequence, a metric M 1 (VD=ON, VM=TBF with smoothing window 5 s) counting the SYN rate is used. If a port scan is detected (ifðF 1 ¼ M 1 Þ > 40) the flow status is updated to "attack", the host is blocked for 2 minutes and an alert is generated. M1 is updated with DFK ¼ ip:srcj ip:dstjtcp:dport and MFK ¼ ip:src when a SYN to an unexpected port is contacted.
DNS Tunneling Detection
DNS tunnelling is an encapsulation mechanism that allows packet tunnelling within a bidirectional DNS communication that can be used for command and control, data exfiltration or tunneling of any internet protocol (IP) traffic (for example to get free Wi-Fi access for sites with a captive portal for http, but free flowing DNS). This use case is based on a recent survey focused on DNS tunnelling detection techniques [17] which takes into consideration several works and extracts set of traffic features used for detection.
The survey considers the following traffic features: 1) size of request and response; 2) entropy of hostnames; 3) statistical analysis: percentage of numerical characters, character frequency analysis etc.; 4) volume of DNS traffic per IP address; 5) volume of DNS traffic per domain; 6) number of hostnames for domain; 6) number of NXDomains; 7) number of orphan DNS requests (DNS requests not followed by any other type requests, like HTTP GET).
As already underlined in Section 1.1, F 2 and F 3 are not supported by the StreaMon measurement layer (even though they represent a perfect use case for transparent HW metric integration). As for the others we have: F 1 is actually just the size of a udp payload. This can be integrated in F 4 ;
where M 1 and M 2 (VD=off) are updated with VMK set to ip:src and ip:dst in case of DNS requests and response respectively (in both cases the update value is udp:len); F 5 ¼ M 3 where M3 (VD=off,) is updated with VMK set to dns:domain and update value set to udp:len; F 6 ¼ M 4 where M4 (VD=on) is updated with VDK ¼ dns:hostname and VMK ¼ dns:domainname and update value set to 1; F 7 is a more complex stateful feature which is computed by implementing the XFSM in Fig. 9 . 5 This feature requires a single metric M5 (VD=off). We evaluated a slightly different configuration from the one derived above, in which F 6 is the number of different hostnames per single IP address and F 7 is the ratio between the number of orphan requests and the total number of DNS requests. The input trace is a small 5 minutes trace captured from our university campus (with a total number of 500 safe internal hosts) merged with a synthetic trace consisting of two hosts performing DNS tunneling with iodine [18] in CNAME and TXT mode. Fig. 10 shows the measurement results. 5. This feature only considers possible subsequent HTTP GET just to simplify the description. Protocols like SIP or FTP may be considered.
ASSESSMENT OVER REAL WORLD TRACES
The experiment described in this section has the final goal of assessing a simple, and yet effective, approach to detect Conficker, one of the largest Botnets found in recent years [19] . The experiment consists of two stage. In stage one we ran the Conficker detection algorithm on a StreaMon probe placed in a strategic point of the Tor Vergata university campus, in such a way that all traffic generated from a honeypot laboratory infected with Conficker was routed through the probe itself. Since the testing environment was clearly pre arranged for technical convenience (i.e., we knew where to find a small group of eight servers infected with Conficker) and the traffic hetherogeneity was unfortunately poor, in stage 2 we ran the same algorithm over a real world traces capture on a router of a national internet service providers in order to prove the actual soundness of the proposed approach.
A multi-step detection algorithm can attempt to track the two following (separated) phase: (1) a bot tries to contact the C&C Server, and (2) a single bot tries to contact and infect other hosts. To contact the C&C Server, infected hosts perform a huge number of DNS queries (with a high NXDomain error probability) to resolve randomly generated domains. In the infection phase, every host tries to open a TCP connection to the ports 445 of random IPs. Our Conficker detector will use the following metrics (VD disabled and VM of type TBF): number of total DNS queries per host (M 1 ), number of DNS NXDomain per host (M 2 ) and number of TCP SYN and SYNACK to/from port 445 (respectively M 3 and M 4 ). These metrics are combined into the following features:
For a DNS NXDomain response, the condition F 1 > 0:25 is checked. If the condition is true, the state of the actual flow changes to alert and an event timeout is set. In the alert state the application updates M 3 and M 4 and, when this timeout expires, these metrics are used to compute F 2 and to verify the related condition: if the condition is true, then the host is considered infected and goes to the next state, otherwise it returns to the default state.
The application XFSM is graphically described (with simplified syntax) in Fig. 4a. Fig. 11 shows the trend of features used in this configuration, for an host infected by Conficker (A) and for a clean host (B). In the first case, the value of F 1 is relatively high since the beginning of the monitoring (due to the presence of reverse DNS queries, easily filtered by the application); the value increases when the host starts to perform Conficker queries. The value of F 2 instead is very low, clearly denoting a port scan. Also for the host B the presence of rDNS queries increases the value of F 1 and this involve a change of state, and the application starts to analyze TCP feature. However the F 2 value (nearly 100 percent of SYN-ACKs are received) excludes a network scan.
In stage 1 we used a trace of 155 minutes with 955 different hosts belonging to 36 different /24 subnetworks. Already with such small numbers we can see the advantage of the stateful offloading related to memory and CPU load saving. Fig. 12 shows (a): Number F 1 of DNS NXDomain responses received per host (430 IPs performing at least 1 DNS query, 401 of them don't receive any NXDomain response); (b): number of tcp packet per seconds for all the flows (pkt1) and only for the flows for which F 1 > ¼ 1 (pkt2), 15 minutes sample; analysis time for whole pkt1 trace: 1,179 seconds, versus 68 seconds for pkt2. In this scenario we obtained 100 percent of detection (eight infected hosts detected) without false positive or false negative.
In stage 2 we tested the same algorithm over a 82 minutes input trace consisting of about 314 M packets (of which 75 percent TCP, 19.5 percent UDP and 5.5 percent others) generated by 579,144 distinct hosts (of which 6,356 placed within the monitored network). The StreaMon probe detected 100 hosts (over 6,356 internal hosts) in alert state, i.e., hosts for which the threshold level of the DNS ratio was exceeded. An offline manual inspection showed that this was due to: (1) legitimate queries generated by antispam Fig. 11 . Conficker features temporal evolution. Fig. 10 . Measurement of F4 (in bytes), F6 and F7 (adimensional) for use case 4.5 with sampling period of 30 seconds. The 3D plot shows a clustered separation between legitimate hosts (red dots), DNS tunneling hosts in mode CNAME (blue dots) and mode TXT (green dots). We showed only three features just in order to provide a clear and compact 3D representation. block list services like spamhaus or spam eating monkey, (2) reverse DNS failed lookups, (3) DNS tunneling tools. The deeper stream-mode TCP analysis performed over the TCP traffic generated by the internal hosts in alert states did not confirm the presence of a single Conficker host. To prove the absence of any false negative verdict, we ran an offline DPI analysis which did not detect any infected host. Again, it is important to underline the importance of the stateful offloading approach provided by StreaMon. Indeed, over a total number of about 314 M packets, the actuals number of packets (TCP and DNS) processed by the probe was 1.7 percent (about 5.46 M).
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we investigate the performance of our current StreaMon prototype. We remark that our current implementation has not been specifically optimized for performance, and some implementation choices are still elementary. 6 Nevertheless, we believe that the following results are very promising, and suggest that the StreaMon's flexibility is not substantially paid in terms of scalability.
Implementation Overview
We experimented StreaMon on two platforms. A SW-only deployment leverages off-the-shelf NIC drivers, integrating the efficient PFQ packet capturing kernel module [20] . To test HW acceleration, we also deployed StreaMon using a 10 gbps Combo FPGA card as packet source. In what follows, unless otherwise specified (specifically, Section 6.2.3 which deals with HW accelerated metrics implemented over the Combo FPGA card) we focus on the SW-only configuration.
StreaMon start-up sequence is summarized as follows: the application program is given as input to a pre-processor script as a XML formatted textual file. The program is parsed, StreaMon process is configured and executed while in parallel the interpreted feature and condition expressions are transformed them into C++ code and build a "on-demand DLL". 7 The average deployment time of the start-up phase is few seconds (less than 3 seconds in our tests). This time is bounded by the DLL compilation time. The same time applies when a new application is started.
StreaMon implementation takes advantages from multicore platforms by implementing parallel processing chains as shown in the implementation architecture depicted in Fig. 13 (for the SW-only setup). The PFQ driver is used as packet filter and configured with a number of software queues equal to the number of cores. Traffic flows are dispatched from the physical queues of the NIC by the PFQ steering function. For each PFQ, a separate StreaMon chain is executed by a single thread with CPU affinity fixed to one of the available core and share the metric banks, status tables and timeout tables (the concurrent access to the shared data is protected by spinlocks).
The throughput measurement has been performed on a Intel Xeon X5650 (2.67 GHz, six cores) Linux server with, 16 GB ram and Intel 82599eb 10 Gbit optical interfaces. (6, 468 Gbps) obtained with one PFQ source block without the overhead of StreaMon, expressed as function of the number of metrics (1, 4, 8, 16, 24, 32) in case of (1, 2, 3, 6) CPU core parallel processing. The input test data is a small portion of a long trace captured within a local internet provider with the following parameters: 6,320,928 packets (31,827 distinct hosts), with AVG packet length of 632.82 bytes, locally replied at an AVG bitrate of 6.47 Gbps.
As expected, the throughput decreases with the number of metrics and grows with the number of cores (even though the growth is lower than expected due to the simple thread concurrency management adopted in this prototype). It is worth noting that the graph shows the worst computational scenario in which: (i) all metrics are sequentially updated and retrieved for each packet (single event and stateless logic) and are configured with both the VD (a BF pair) and the MV (DLEFT) enabled; (ii) all flow keys are different (n metrics, n * 2 flow keys). Nevertheless, the results are promising, as for example in case of 16 metrics, for which we observe the following average bitrate (Gbps): 6. E.g., the very basic dispatching of one packet per core, while metric computations remain shared causing obvious inefficiencies.
7. Note that this is an optimization step which is devised to on-thefly compile (transparent to the programmer), the application code, so as to avoid a "feature/condition interpreter", which would have lowered the overall performance and would not have permitted line rate feature computation and condition verification. Since no recompilation of the StreaMon code is ever needed, but user defined features are integrated as a DLL, dynamic deployment of user programs is made possible.
Without discussing here the advantages of a stateful pre-filtering (which will be shown in Section 6.2.2), we want to underline that, in the typical case in which not all the metrics are updated for each packet and require distinct flow keys, we can experience a better relation between the processing throughput and the number of metrics. For this reason, we compared the average throughput obtained by executing the traffic classification algorithm described in [9] (the most computational demanding algorithm cited in 1, in terms of number of distinct metrics and flow keys, and portion of processed traffic). The following table shows the average bitrate (in Gbps) obtained by [9] in case of TCP classification ([9] : six metrics, three flowkeys) and the average bitrate of the worst case (six metrics and 12 flow keys). The above presented results give a proof of the scalability of the StreaMon approach. We believe that sustaining 32 metrics is a good test bench as this would allow us to run several concurrent applications at line rate. Indeed, if we consider all five use cases in Section 4 plus the simple one in 3.4, we need a total number of metrics equal to 15. Table 2 shows the details of the test traces used for three among the use cases presented in Section 4 and the their performance evaluation, where pkt. no is the total number of packets, AVG plen is the average packet length, M and FK are the total number of metrics and flow keys, TX is the AVG traffic injection bitrate.
Use Case Performance Evaluation
As already underlined, the use case applications experience a better throughput with respect to the bitrate obtained with the same number of metrics in the worst case measurement showed in 14. Note that due to the different performances of the COMBO card processor and the limitation to single core processing, 8 the encrypted flow detection use case performance is omitted to avoid confusion, as it would present results not directly comparable with the others.
FPGA Accelerated Primitives
As already discussed, our current StreaMon prototype supports seamless integration of HW precomputed primitives, and in particular we have implemented packet entropy computation (see Section 4.3) and event parsing on a INVEA-TECH Combo FPGA card [21] . The interface between the Combo card and StreaMon core software is realized via a footer appended to the ethernet frame. The Combo card capture the packet traveling in the network under inspection, performs the required operation and transfer the resulting metrics and signals as a list of Type Len Value to the PC hosting the capture card. This list of TLV is parsed by the Event Layer and will be available to the remaining layers.
Our next step is to implement a full deep packet inspection module. To confirm its necessity, we have so far implemented a simplified content matching packet payload inspection primitive in both SW and HW [22] . Fig. 15 compares the two implementations for a toy example of just 32 content strings, showing the severe performance degradation of the SW implementation even in such small scale example. At the same time, the figure shows that, by offloading content matching primitives to the HW front-end, our prototype achieves almost optimal throughput performance.
RELATED WORK
In the literature, several monitoring platforms have targeted monitoring applications' programmability. A Monitoring API for programmable HW network adapters is proposed in [23] . On top of such probe, network administrators may implement custom C++ monitoring applications. One of the developed applications is Appmon [24] . It uses deep packet inspection to classify observed flows and attribute these flows to an application. Flow states are stored in an hash table and retrieved when an old flow is observed again. This way to handle states bears some resemblance with that proposed in this work, which however makes usage of (much) more descriptive eXtended Finite State Machines. CoMo [25] is another well known network monitoring platform. We share with CoMo the (for us, side) idea of extensible plug-in metric modules, but besides this we are quite orthogonal to such work, as we rather focus on how to combine metrics with features and states using higher level programming techniques (versus CoMo's low level queries).
Bro [26] provides a monitoring framework relying on event-based programming language for real time statistics and notification. Despite the attempt to define a versatile high level language, Bro is not designed to expose a clear and simple abstraction for monitoring application development and leave full programmability to its users (which results in a more complex programming language). The Real-Time Communications Monitoring (RTCMon) framework [27] permits development of monitoring applications, but again the development language is a low level one (C++), and (unlike us) any feature extraction and state handling must be dealt with inside the custom application logic developed by the programmer. CoralReef [28] , FLAME [29] and Blockmon [30] are other frameworks which grant full programmability by permitting the monitoring application developers to "hook" their custom C/C++/Perl traffic analysis function to the platform. On a different line, a number of monitoring frameworks are based on suitable extensions of Data Stream Management Systems (DSMS). PaQueT [31] , and more recently BackStreamDB [32] , are programmable monitoring frameworks developed as an extension of the Borealis DSMS [33] . Ease of programming and high flexibility is provided by permitting users to define new traffic metrics by simply performing queries to the DSMS. The DSMS is configured through an XML file that is processed to obtain a C++ application code. Gigascope [34] is another stream database for network monitoring that provide an architecture programmable via SQL-like queries.
Opensketch [4] is a recent work proposing an efficient generic data plane based on programmable metric sketches. If on the one hand we share with Opensketch the same measurement approach, on the other hand its data plane abstraction delegates any decision stage and logic adaptation the control plane and, with reference to our proposed abstraction, does not go beyond the functionalities of our proposed Measurement Subsystem. On the same line, ProgME [35] is a programmable measurement framework which revolves around the extended and more scalable notion of dynamic flowset composition, for which it provides a novel functional language.
StreaMon versus Openflow-Inspired by the pragmatic vision fostered by Openflow [3] , we also believe that vendors will hardly open 9 their monitoring devices, so as to permit full programmability of traffic analysis applications. This prevents the ability for vendors to commercially endorse remarkable solutions, where monitoring application programmers are given a very large flexibility in developing custom monitoring applications, using general-purpose SW languages. Nevertheless, our resulting data plane abstraction and the resulting API are fundamentally different. Indeed, an Openflow-like match/action table appears insufficient for monitoring purposes, even if we assume tailored match/action primitives as most monitoring applications ultimately need to infer some high level result (e.g., anomalies or threats) from the analysis of the traffic dynamics, as they evolve with time.
Even though equivalent dynamic tracking strategies might be realized exploiting standard Openflow multiple tables, metadata and by delegating "monitoring intelligence" to Openflow controllers, this approach would require to fully develop the specific application logic and to forward all packets to an external controller, (like in Openflow based monitoring tool FRESCO [36] ), which will increase complexity and affect performance. As further prof of the increasing interest in stateful and self adapting data plane abstractions in the SDN community, we report two very recent works [37] , [38] that share the intuition of providing SDN switches with the ability of changing their forwarding behavior by exploiting state machines directly at data plane.
Usage of XFSM-While our work is, to the best of our knowledge, the first which exploits eXtended Finite State Machines for programming custom monitoring logic, we acknowledge that (and were inspired by) the idea of using XFSM as programming language for networking purposes was proposed in a completely different field (wireless MAC protocols programmability) by [39] . The technical development in this work, however, widely departs from [39] , owing to the completely different types of events, actions, and scenario (one state machine for a MAC protocol in [39] , versus many concurrent per-flow state machines in our case). Finally, the use of XFSMs for networking SDN applications as been also adopted in [37] .
CONCLUSION
The StreaMon programmable monitoring framework described in this paper aims at making the deployment of monitoring applications as fast an easy as configuring a set of pre-established metrics and devising a state machine which orchestrates their operation while following the evolution of attacks and anomalies. Indeed, the major contribution of the paper is the design of a pragmatic application programming interface for developing stream-based monitoring tasks, which does not require programmers to access the monitoring device internals. Despite their simplicity, we believe that the wide range of features accounted in the proposed use cases suggest that StreaMon's flexibility can be exploited to deploy several real world applications.
Even if our prototype already exhibits meaningful performance, in the gbps area, further work in the performance optimization direction is planned, by investigating and integrating solutions to: (i) support configurable interaction with the packet capture driver to realize adaptative queue balancing and flow key extraction offload; (ii) exploit flow key caching strategies; (iii) improve the current multicore architecture; (iv) support parallel execution of real time monitoring application; (v) simplify the current verbose XML syntax and provide a light object oriented API.
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